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CONVERGENCE AND
INCONGRUENCE: TRADEMARK LAW
AND ICANN'S INTRODUCTION OF NEW
GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS
CHRISTINE HAIGHT FARLEY*

This essay participates in a larger discussion of the convergence between law and technology by analyzing an example in trademark law
that has not gotten as much attention as it deserves: ICANN's new policy
on introducing new generic top-level domains ("gTLDs"). This policy is
certainly located at the intersection of technology and law. I argue that
in this example, the convergence is problematic because many of the
technical strategies and legal concepts involved are treated as if they are
congruent. They are not.
Recall the old debate, circa 1999, between Judge Frank Easterbrook
and Professor Larry Lessig about cyberspace and the law of the horse. In
this debate, Easterbrook said, "Let us not struggle to match an imperfect
legal system to an evolving world that we understand poorly."1 In his
published retort, Larry Lessig challenged Easterbrook and others who
shared the same view. The mistake they make is to wrongly assume the
2
design of cyberspace cannot be changed.
The example discussed within this Article speaks to both Easterbrook and Lessig's concerns about conventional thinking on law and
cyberspace, but also raises a third point. In this example of convergence,
we have the designers of the space, ICANN, using law to alter the architecture of that space. This is not a case in which law is being used after
* Christine Haight Farley is a professor of law and associate dean for faculty and
academic affairs at American University Washington College of law. She teaches courses
in intellectual property law, trademark law, and visual arts law. She has a J.D. from SUNY
Buffalo School of Law, and LL.M. and J.S.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. from
SUNY Binghamton. I want to thank Doris Estelle Long for organizing this conference and
inviting me to participate. I am indebted to the research assistance of Lena Saltos and
Paul Butler. Please send any comments to cfarley@wcl.american.edu.
1. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHi. LE.
GAL F. 207.

2. See Larry Lessig, Commentaries: The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARv. L. REV. 502 (1999).
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the fact to control the chaos that has emerged because of technology or
the architecture of cyberspace. Instead, this is a preemptive move to appropriate a legal principle in order to shape technological change.
A brief explanation of the new policy is in order. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or ICANN, is the body that
governs the Internet's infrastructure. At present, ICANN has accredited
fifteen gTLDs operating on the internet such as .com, .net, .edu, as well
as less familiar ones such as .mobi, .info, .jobs and .biz. 3 Recently,
ICANN approved a new policy that would allow it to accept or reject applications for additional gTLDs. What makes this new policy radical is
that it is not meant to just provide a handful of new gTLDs. Nor is it
meant to provide a set a period for applications or specific ideas about
what areas these new gTLDs will designate. Instead, what ICANN is
considering is a uniform system to approve generic top level domains
that is expected to have profound implications. ICANN expects to approve hundreds of new gTLDs annually in the future. 4 It is possible that
eventually thousands of new gTLDs will be approved eventually.
The profound change that ICANN expects is delineated on their
website: "New generic top-level domains may change the whole way we
approach the Internet in the future."'5 Under this new plan anyone can
apply for a new gTLD at any time and it could be literally dot anything.
Incredibly enough, this policy is almost completely under way. The
Generic Names Supporting Organization ("GNSO") a subgroup within
ICANN, drafted the proposed policy. In June, the President and CEO of
ICANN, Dr. Paul Twomey, stated that the board had "accepted a recommendation from its global stakeholders that it is possible to implement
many new names to the Internet. '6 However, before ICANN can introduce this new system another final draft of the implementation plan
must be approved by the board, which is set to be published in early
2009.7 Assuming that the plan will be approved by the ICANN board,
the applications for new domain names will be available as early as the
second half of 2009.8
3. See

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, SEMI-ANNUAL RE-

(2007), available at http://www.icann.net/compliance/reports/contractual-complianceaudit-report-18octO7.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Danny Younger, Languages in the Root: A TLD Launch Strategy Based on
ISO 639, http://www.circleid.com/posts/languages-in the root a-tld launch-strategybased on iso 639 (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) (stating that more than 400 language-associated TLDs alone, are currently being proposed).
5. See 30th International Public ICANN meeting, http://losangeles2007.icann.org/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
6. See Biggest Expansion in gTLDs Approved for Implementation, http://www.icann.
org/en/announcements/announcement-4-26jun08-en.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
PORT
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Through the Draft Final Report, ICANN has explicitly stated its intention to make the gTLD application process open and transparent. Indeed, the Draft Final Report has focused the issues and prompted a
useful discussion. However, because the new gTLD policy imports certain concepts and doctrines from trademark law in an effort to address
architecture issues, this policy would result in long-term problems both
for domain names and for trademark law jurisprudence.
The proposal includes twenty recommendations. This Article focuses only on the three recommendations that rely heavily on trademark
law concepts. Interestingly, the first recommendation espouses the principles of fairness, transparency and non-discrimination. The second recommendation deals with trademark rights. So just in terms of
placement, we can see how highly trademark rights are valued by this
organization.
RECOMMENDATION 2: "STRINGS MUST NOT BE CONFUSINGLY
SIMILAR TO AN EXISTING TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN." 9
In this recommendation, it appears the Committee is conflating two
distinctly different concepts: confusing similarity and likelihood of confusion. The Draft Final Report states that, "'confusingly similar' is used to
mean that there is a likelihood of confusion." 10 However, confusingly
similar is a different legal standard than likelihood of confusion. The
Committee appears to base this recommendation on Section 3.7.7.9 of
the ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement, which implies the legal
standard is consistent. However, that section of the ICANN Agreement
explicitly employs the standard of infringement, which is a likelihood of
confusion.
A determination about whether use of a mark by another is "confusingly similar" is simply a first step in the analysis of infringement. As
the Committee correctly notes, visual, phonetic and conceptual similarities will be taken into account. However, this determination does not
end the analysis. For example, Delta Dental and Delta Airlines are confusingly similar, but are not likely to cause confusion, and therefore do
not infringe. As U.S. trademark law clearly states the standard for infringement is whether the use of a mark is such "as to be likely, when
used on or in connection with the goods of such other person, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."" While it may be that
most cases of confusing similarity are likely to cause confusion, because
9. See

DRAFT

FINAL

REPORT

OF

THE

GNSP NEW TLDs

INTRODUCTION OF NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS

COMMITTEE

ON

THE

2.iii (2007), available at http://gnso.

icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-draft-fr.htm.
10. See id.
11. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(3)(d) (2007).
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the infringement standard takes into account how and where the mark is
used, some cases of confusing similarity likely will not cause confusion.
In trademark law, where there is confusing similarity and the mark
is used on similar goods or services, a likelihood of confusion will usually
be found. European trademark law recognizes this point perhaps more
readily than U.S. trademark law. As a result, sometimes "confusingly
similar" is used as shorthand for "likelihood of confusion." 1 2 However,
these concepts must remain distinct in domain name policy where there
is no opportunity to consider how the mark is being used. As applied to
domain names, the only level of analysis is the first level of analysis:
confusing similarity.
This policy proposes comparing existing second level domains with
proposed dot generics. Consider www.amazon.com versus an application
for .amazon, where .amazon might be a top-level domain dedicated to the
study of all things having to do with the Amazon. These two applications
are certainly confusingly similar. They are identical words, therefore
they would fail the test provided by this ICANN proposal. However, this
hypothetical is acceptable under trademark law because the analysis
13
considers the context of the use.
A related problem with this recommendation is that it equates domain names with trademarks as legally protectable properties. They are
not. Trademarks are legally protected intellectual property because the
commercial use of a mark by another that is likely to cause confusion
would injure consumers. Also, trademarks are legally protectable intellectual property because their owners have developed valuable goodwill
in the marks. Neither of these conditions of legal protection applies in
the case of domain names that are not trademarks. Under this scenario,
my university, because it has registered the domain name
www.american.edu, would be able to prevent anyone from applying for
the new top level domain of .american, or even .america, simply by virtue
of owning the www.american.edu domain.
Moreover, it is not clear what consumers would be confused about
when encountering a string that is confusingly similar to an existing toplevel domain. Unlike trademarks, strings are not inherently commercial
communication means, and therefore it does not follow that consumers
would incorrectly assume that the string would indicate source of origin.
For example, www.getty.museum does not suggest to consumers a connection with www.museum.com.
12. See Statement of the Non-Commercial Users Constituency, IP Justice: An International Civil Liberties Organization Promoting Balanced Intellectual Property Laws and
Free Expression, http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/02/20/domain-names-are-bigger-than-trademarks-icanns-new-consumer-protection-role/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
13. Similarly, another bookstore, www.borders.com, might present a new gTLD for
.borders dedicated to the study of border issues.
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Beyond top-level domains, the Draft Final Report states that
"strings should not be confusingly similar either to existing top-level do14
mains like .com and .net or to existing trademark and famous names."
The Draft Final Report notes that the Committee relied on "a wide variety of existing law" to reach this standard. 15 And yet, "famous names" is
not a legal category under any trademark law. International trademark
law grants rights to "well-known marks"'16 and to "trade names,"'1 7 and
U.S. law grants rights to "famous marks,"' 8 but "famous names" seems
to be a construct created by the Committee. Clearly, the domain name
policy should protect only recognized intellectual property.
RECOMMENDATION 3: "STRINGS MUST NOT INFRINGE THE
EXISTING LEGAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS THAT ARE RECOGNIZED
OR ENFORCEABLE UNDER GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF LAW." 19
There are simply too many legally recognized trademarks in the
world to make this recommendation workable. The United States alone
registers well over 100,000 trademarks each year and there were
1,322,155 active certificates of registration last year. 20 In the United
States, state registered trademarks and common law trademarks are
also legally recognized. Protected trademarks include commonly used
words, geographical terms, names, and fanciful words.
Examples of trademarked words that may therefore be unavailable
as a new gTLD under this recommendation include McDonald's
SMILE@, Microsoft's WINDOWS@, and Macintosh's APPLE®. It is difficult to understand what public purpose is served by prohibiting the use
of these commonly used terms. For example, a trademark owner that
14. See DRAFT
TION OF

FINAL REPORT OF THE

GNSO NEW TLDs

COMMITTEE ON THE INTRODUC-

NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS 2.iii (2007), available at http://gnso.icann.org/

drafts/pdp-dec05-draft-fr.htm (emphasis added).

15. Id.
16. See Paris Convention, at Article 6bis (1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo02O.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
17. See Paris Convention, at Article 1 available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
paris/trtdocs-wo020.html ( "The protection of industrial property has as its object patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of
source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition.").
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(c) (2007).
19. See DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE GNSP NEW TLDs COMMITTEE ON THE
INTRODUCTION OF NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINs 2.iii (2007), available at http://gnso.
icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-draft-fr.htm.
20. In 2006, the USPTO reported that 147,118 trademarks were registered. See U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FIscAL YEAR

(2006),
html.

available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/50315_tablel5.
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has been allowed registration due to an arbitrary association between a
mark and a business may be able to prevent a community who would use
it in a purely descriptive sense. More perplexing is that under this rule,
the Cherokee Nation would be unable to use CHEROKEE as a gTLD
because some automobile company is said to have prior rights under this
policy.
Also U.S. law provides the defense of fair use where a trademark
owner has captured a descriptive term. Then, competitors are free to employ it so long as they do not use it as a mark. A gTLD is necessarily a
use not as a mark. A second level domain maybe, but definitely not a
gTLD.
RECOMMENDATION 6: "STRINGS MUST NOT BE CONTRARY TO
GENERALLY ACCEPTED LEGAL NORMS RELATING TO
MORALITY AND PUBLIC ORDER THAT ARE ENFORCEABLE
UNDER GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND INTERNATIONALLY
21
RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF LAW."
The Committee is correct that a variety of trademark legislation restricts trademark registration based on some notion of offense or immorality. Unfortunately, the Committee seeks to extend this trademark
law concept to domain name policy. This extension is not a natural one
and presents many problems in its application.
Where these content restrictions exist in trademark law, they are
understood as merely restricting the registration of trademarks, not the
use of such trademarks. That is, under certain legislation a trademark
may be deemed unregistrable, but the trademark owner may still use the
trademark in commerce and may even have the benefit of legal protection over the trademark. 2 2 The only restriction is that the trademark
owner is denied certain benefits of registration.
The United States has such a content restriction in its trademark
2
law. 3 What saves this legislation from violating the First Amendment
is that it is not a restriction on use; it is merely a restriction on certain
legal benefits deriving from federal registration. Any restriction of the
use of the trademark would need to comply with the First Amendment.
21. See

DRAFT

FINAL

REPORT

OF

THE

GNSP NEw TLDs COMMITTEE ON THE
(2007), available at http://gnso.

INTRODUCTION OF NEW GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAINs 2.iii

icann.org/drafts/pdp-dec05-draft-fr.htm.
22. Unregistered marks are granted legal protection under U.S. federal law. See 15
U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2007).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2007). Under U.S. law, marks can be refused registration if they
are regarded as "immoral or scandalous." Id. However, even if a mark is found to be immoral and therefore unregistrable, a mark owner may still use the mark to market its
goods in commerce and may still avail itself of federal trademark protections including
bringing suit in U.S. courts. Id.
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For instance, a mark may be restricted from use where it has been found
to be obscene. Obscenity is a legal category whose threshold is well
above the category of immoral or offensive speech.
The restriction of a generic top-level domain is more akin to the restriction on use than to the restriction on federal trademark registration.
Restricting offensive words in gTLDs would restrict the ability of all
speakers, commercial and non-commercial, thus ICANN should consider
legal models outside of trademark law to better address the balance of
speech rights. This recommendation incorrectly conflates use and registration in domain name policy.
This recommendation also illustrates the lack of fit between trademark law and domain name policy. Trademark law is territorial in nature, therefore legal standards reflect the consumer perspectives of the
particular state. These standards are thus expected to vary from state to
state. One way this occurs is the way consumers respond to marks in
one state may differ from the way consumers would respond to the same
mark in another state. Trademark content restrictions are similar in approach. For instance, under U.S. trademark law, a mark will be refused
registration if it is deemed to be scandalous or immoral when considered
from the perspective of "a substantial composite of the general public. '24
The "public" is understood to mean the U.S. public. 2 5 To extend this legal standard to domain names it is necessary to consider a substantial
composite of the general public of the entire world, not just the United
States. This is obviously an unworkable standard. Even if it were a
workable standard, it results in the lowest common denominator analysis much like obscenity analysis over the Internet. Thus, for example,
.democracy, .gayrights, and .jesus, may all be refused as being morally
offensive to the least tolerant society.
Moreover, trademark law standards are always applied in the context of how a consumer would encounter the mark. Thus, the USPTO
and the courts consider the entire label, what products or services are
sold under the mark, and what channels of commerce and marketing will
be used. As a result, marks challenged as being scandalous may in fact
be found to have a double entendre. 26 Thus, the extension of this trademark law standard to domain name policy risks prohibiting words as generic top-level domains that could used in inoffensive ways. For
example, it may be possible to register the word Nazi as a mark if the
24. See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

25. For this reason, different jurisdictions apply different protections. For example,
"feta" is legally understood in the E.U. to be a product of Greece, whereas U.S. consumers
would probably recognize it as a type of cheese that can be produced anywhere.
26. See, e.g., In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding the mark was
not scandalous when considered in the context of the design that accompanied it).
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context of the use conveys a meaning that is not scandalous to a substantial composite of the public, such as in Soup Nazi.
A few other observations are in order. First, under U.S. trademark
law, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, both the USPTO and the Federal
Circuit will pass the mark to publication to give others the opportunity to
object. 2 7 If ICANN decides to employ any content restrictions, it should
err on the side of permitting the speech as a rule.
Second, the Paris Convention permits rather than requires content
restrictions. Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention merely allows a
Member state to deny registration to a mark duly registered in another
Member state on the grounds of morality or public order. 28 This article
makes clear the expectation that a mark may be acceptable in one state,
while it is offensive in another. The WTO TRIPS Agreement is silent on
29
content restrictions.
Finally, the provision in U.S. trademark law that prohibits registration of scandalous or immoral marks is little known or utilized. 30 Furthermore, the majority of challenges brought under this provision are
brought by third parties and not the USPTO.
CONCLUSION
So, what is at stake here? What does it matter if a group of techies
at ICANN do not fully understand the nuances of trademark law?
Jonathon Zittrain argued that domain name policy is of no consequence
and that nobody should bother themselves with domain name policy because we rely so heavily on search engines, domain name policy simply
does not matter. The opposing view is that domain name policy does
matter because changes in policy such as this one may create a slippery
slope where a technical organization like ICANN slides into a more
prominent position in Internet governance.
But of greater concern in this particular convergence of law and
technology is the incongruence between trademark and domain names.
It is important to note this general lack of equivalence between trademark law and domain name policy. For instance, trademark law the
world over is fundamentally based on the concept of territoriality. Thus,
trademark law seeks to protect regionally-based marks and market27. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 19.77 (4th ed. 2007).
28. See Paris Convention, at Article 6 quinquies available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs-wo02O.html (stating that marks duly registered in another
Member state may be refused registration "when they are contrary to morality or public
order and, in particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public").
29. See TRIPS: AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS §2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t-agm3-e.htm#2.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2007).
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based marks without implication for the protection or availability of that
mark in another region or market. In contrast, domain names have
global reach, are accessible everywhere and have implications for speech
around the world.
Likewise, trademark protections hinge on what the relevant consumer thinks. Again, the law considers the viewpoints of consumers of a
particular country, region or market, and acknowledges the variability of
these viewpoints across regions. Domain names are not directed to a certain class or geographical region of consumers-they are accessible to all.
Therefore, to take account of consumers' viewpoints, it would be necessary to consider a global public. The resulting one-size-fits-all approach
would be anathema to trademark law in that it would leave consumers
confused in one place, while unjustifiably denying speech rights in
another.
Finally, trademarks rights are not applied abstractly or in theory,
but are always considered in context. Thus, in order to determine
whether the use of a mark by another would likely cause confusion, it is
necessary to analyze how the mark is used in commerce. Consideration
will be given to what goods or services bear the mark, what overall design or color scheme accompanies the use of the mark, what the level of
consumer sophistication is, and what marketing channels are used. The
gTLDs are necessarily abstract. We cannot know in advance what the
content of a website hosted on a certain domain will be. It is therefore
impossible to make fine-tuned conclusions about the appropriateness of
certain domains. Trademark rights have legal limits and defenses. For
these reasons, I strongly urge domain name policy makers to consider
carefully the appropriateness of importing trademark law concepts into
domain name policy.
What is at stake here is the risk that fundamental principles of
trademark law will lose their force. Concepts such as territoriality considering marks in context and considering consumers' perceptions act as
important limitations on the rights of trademark owners. Stated succinctly, my fear is that this policy wrenches trademark law out of its
practice with limitations and defenses poses a danger to expression for
domain names and trademarks. This risk should be of concern to anyone
who cares about trademark policy.
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